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THE NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF CONFUSION OVER
COLLATERAL AGREEMENTS UNDER THE
INDIAN GAMING REGULATORY ACT: WHICH
AGREEMENTS NEED REVIEW?
Matthew D. Craig
INTRODUCTION
A bank hired a top-100 law firm1 to document loans for a $28 million Indian
gaming casino financing project.2 Whether done as the result of genuine
confusion or neglect, the law firm did not encourage the bank to seek approval
from the National Indian Gaming Commission (“NIGC”) regarding a Notice and
Acknowledgement of Pledge agreement.3 After the transaction had closed and
the loans were funded, it appeared that everything was proceeding as planned —
until the borrower defaulted.4 The bank engaged the law firm to recover what
was owed under the agreement; however, the casino owner claimed that the
agreement was unenforceable for lack of NIGC approval.5 Although eventually
reversed on other grounds, the casino received a multi-million-dollar legal
malpractice verdict against the law firm.6
Despite the eventual reversal of the malpractice verdict against it, the law
firm undoubtedly suffered significant expenses and harm over the protracted,
decade-long litigation,7 all of which resulted from confusion over a single

Rankings & Reviews for Dorsey & Whitney LLP, VAULT.COM,
http://www.vault.com/company-profiles/law/dorsey-whitney-llp/companyoverview.aspx (last visited Oct. 13, 2017).
2
Heidi M. Staudenmaier & Ruth K. Khalsa, Theseus, the Labyrinth, and the Ball of
String: Navigating the Regulatory Maze to Ensure Enforceability of Tribal Gaming
Contracts, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1123, 1127 (2007) [hereinafter Staudenmaier &
Khalsa, Theseus] (citing SRC Holding Corp., 352 B.R. 103 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2007)).
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Leonard v. Dorsey & Whitney LLP, 553 F.3d 609, 631 (8th Cir. 2009);
Staudenmaier & Khalsa, Theseus, supra note 2, at 1127-28.
7
Martha Neil, 8th Circuit Sides with Dorsey & Whitney in $900K Malpractice Case,
ABA J., (Jan. 16, 2009, 11:43 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/ article/
8th_circuit_sides_with_dorsey_whitney_in_900k_malpractice_case.
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question: Which agreements require NIGC approval to be enforceable under the
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (“IGRA”)? Tribes and the law firms representing
them are put in a difficult position due to confusion in the courts over this
seemingly simple question. Adding to the confusion is the NIGC’s suggestion
that tribes submit all collateral contracts to determine whether they are collateral
contracts (which may not require NIGC approval) or management contracts
(which require NIGC approval).8 In effect, tribes interested in entering gamingrelated contracts, even those tangentially related to gaming, are forced to seek
NIGC review or risk the potentially harsh consequences of an unenforceable
agreement. This requirement places an additional and unnecessary burden on
tribes, beyond that required under IGRA, thus inhibiting IGRA’s stated goal of
promoting tribal economic development and self-sufficiency.
I. MANAGEMENT CONTRACTS AND COLLATERAL AGREEMENTS UNDER IGRA
Consistent with its stated purpose to protect Indian tribes from organized
crime and overreaching by management companies,9 IGRA includes many
safeguards to prevent non-Indians from taking advantage of tribes involved in
gaming.10 One primary safeguard is the NIGC’s review of contracts between
Indian tribes engaged in gaming and outside parties—specifically, outside
management companies.11 These IGRA provisions provide the NIGC with the
authority to review and approve contracts between Indian tribes engaged in
gaming and management companies seeking to engage in management of tribal
casinos. This safeguard also has the consequence of rendering certain
unapproved contracts void.12
A. Management Contracts
25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(9) provides that an Indian tribe may enter into a
management contract for the operation of a Class III gaming activity, if the
agreement is approved by the Chairman of the NIGC.13 As noted in the IGRA,
however, while Secretarial review of management contracts concerning Indian
gaming is required, IGRA does not provide standards for approval of such

8

See infra Part I.A-B.
Indian Gaming Regulation Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2702 (2012) provides, in relevant part:
“The purpose of this chapter is . . . to provide a statutory basis for the regulation of
gaming by an Indian tribe adequate to shield it from organized crime and other
corrupting influences, to ensure that the Indian tribe is the primary beneficiary of the
gaming operation, and to assure that gaming is conducted fairly and honestly by both
the operator and players . . .”
10
FELIX S. COHEN, COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FED. INDIAN LAW § 12.08 (2012) (2015
supplement) [hereinafter COHEN].
11
See 25 U.S.C. § 2711 (2012); see also 25 C.F.R. §§ 531, 533, 537 (2017).
12
See 25 U.S.C. § 2771(f) (2012).
13
25 U.S.C. § 2701(d)(9) (2012).
9
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contracts.14 Although IGRA does not define management, 25 C.F.R. § 502.19
provides that a primary management official is any person “who has
authority . . . [t]o set up working policy for the gaming operation.”15
The result of failure to gain NIGC approval of a management contract is a
voided contract.16 Further, a management contract that has not been approved by
the NIGC is not legally binding.17 Because of the harsh potential consequences
of failure to gain NIGC approval of a management contract, it is essential to
determine which agreements qualify as management contracts.
25 C.F.R. § 502.15 defines management contracts as, “any contract,
subcontract, or collateral agreement between an Indian tribe and a contractor or
between a contractor and a subcontractor if such contract or agreement provides
for the management of all or part of a gaming operation.”18 In determining
whether an agreement is a management contract, it is important to remember that
“[i]f any term of the contract relates to some type of management activity . . . the
agreement should be submitted to the NIGC for approval or declination.”19
Any contract that gives a contractor authority to control or direct any aspect
of gaming activity qualifies as a management contract.20 For example, in First
American Kickapoo Operations, L.L.C. v. Multimedia Games, Incorporated,21
an operating lease that granted a contractor the opportunity “to set up working
policy” for the tribe’s gaming operation was a management contract which
required NIGC review under IGRA.22 The court held that the contract was a
management contract because it authorized the contractor “to exert considerable
and continuing influence over the day-to-day running” of the gaming operation.23
Similarly, in United States ex rel. Bernard v. Casino Magic, despite an
express provision to the contrary, an agreement’s requirement that a tribe comply
with a contractor’s recommendations, when viewed together with other
agreements, constituted a management contract under IGRA.24 Finally, in New
Gaming Systems Incorporated v. National Indian Gaming Commission, an
equipment lease and a promissory note that granted a contractor control over the
type of gaming equipment available at the casino and required the tribe to use a
specific cash accounting system in exchange for a percentage fee, was a

Id. § 2701(2).
25 C.F.R. § 502.19 (b)(2) (2017).
16
Id. § 533.7.
17
See, e.g., First Am. Kickapoo Operations v. Multimedia Games, 412 F.3d 1166,
1176 (10th Cir. 2005).
18
25 C.F.R. § 502.15 (2017).
19
Staudenmaier & Khalsa, Theseus, supra note 2, at 1156.
20
COHEN, supra note 9, at § 12.08[3].
21
Kickapoo, 412 F.3d at 1166.
22
Id. at 1172.
23
Id. at 1178.
24
293 F.3d 419, 424-26 (8th Cir. 2002).
14
15
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management contract requiring NIGC approval.25
In an extreme example, one court found that a tribe’s agreement to transfer
the right to manage gaming operations over a facility on tribal lands pursuant to
an agreement to be negotiated is itself a management contract because it
effectively alienates the tribe’s right to negotiate with any other potential
manager and, thus, gives the contractor the exclusive ability to conduct gaming
for the tribe.26
Agreements that do not provide the right or contingent right for a contractor
to manage, however, are not management contracts under IGRA and do not
require NIGC approval to be enforceable. For example, a contract for
construction of a casino that does not provide for gaming responsibilities does
not qualify as a management contract, thus, it does not require NIGC approval.27
B. Collateral Agreements
A management contract “is often only one component of a complex
relationship between an Indian tribe and an outside entity.”28 Tribes and
contractors may, in addition to management contracts, reach agreements for
other services, such as construction and development, financing, and purchase of
land.29 A collateral agreement is:
[A]ny contract, whether or not in writing, that is related,
either directly or indirectly, to a management contract, or
to any rights, duties or obligations created between a tribe
(or any of its members, entities, or organizations) and a
management contractor or subcontractor (or any person or
entity related to a management contractor or
subcontractor).30
The NIGC has never asserted that every document qualifying as a collateral
agreement is subject to approval by the NIGC.31 Courts, however, have shown
confusion over which collateral agreements require approval by the NIGC.32 As
a result, some courts have incorrectly presumed that all documents meeting the
definition of collateral agreement require approval.33 For example, in United
896 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 1102-05 (W.D. Okla. 2012).
COHEN, supra note 9, at § 12.08[3] (citing Machal, Inc. v. Jena Band of Choctaw
Indians, 387 F. Supp. 2d 659, 669 (W.D. La. 2005)).
27
See generally United States ex rel. St. Regis Mohawk Tribe v. President R.C.-St.
Regis Mgmt. Co., 451 F.3d 44 (2d Cir. 2006) [hereinafter “Mohawk”].
28
Kevin K. Washburn, The Mechanics of Indian Gaming Management Contract
Approval, 8 GAMING L. REV. 333, 344 (2004) [hereinafter Washburn, Mechanics].
29
Id.
30
25 C.F.R. § 502.5 (2017).
31
See Mohawk, 451 F.3d at 51 (recognizing broad power of NIGC to determine
which contracts require approval).
32
See Washburn, Mechanics, supra note 27, at 345.
33
See Mohawk, 451 F.3d at 47(dictum); see also COHEN, supra note 9, at § 12.08.
25
26
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States ex rel. St. Regis Mohawk Tribe v. President R.C.-St. Regis Management
Company, the court explicitly stated that the approval provisions that apply to
management contracts apply to collateral agreements.34
This assertion is, however, patently incorrect. This is because “[t]he NIGC
has authority to approve a collateral agreement only if it also meets the definition
of ‘management contract’; that is, provides for the ‘management of all or part of
a gaming operation.’”35 Therefore, collateral agreements not meeting the
definition of management contracts or contracts collateral to a management
contract are not subject to NIGC approval.36 Thus, such contracts are enforceable
under traditional contract principles. Further, the NIGC does not even have
standards for approving collateral agreements that do not qualify as management
contracts.37 One of the primary reasons for this confusion is that the NIGC has
never been a party to the federal court decisions concerning IGRA approval
requirements of collateral agreements.38
Admittedly, some courts have found that even agreements that are collateral
to a management contract require NIGC approval. For example, in Match-E-BeNash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Kean-Argovitz Resorts, L.L.C.,
the court held that a development agreement drafted to allow development during
the NIGC approval process was unenforceable, despite two express disclaimer
provisions in the contract that it was not a management contract.39
The court found the development contract was unenforceable for three
reasons. First, the agreement provided that the non-tribal contractor would
arrange all funding for the casino and pre-opening costs.40 The loans for this
provision were to be repaid solely from gaming revenue and the contractor’s loan
commitment was consideration for exclusive development rights.41 Second, an
exclusivity provision in the agreement provided that the tribe agreed to use only
the contractor for all gaming-related development on tribal land.42 Third, the
enforceability of the collateral agreement was conditioned upon NIGC approval
of the management contract, thus, the collateral agreement was essentially a part
of the management contract, albeit by a different name.43
Similarly, in Jena Band of Choctaw Indians v. Tri-Millennium Corporation,
a single provision that provided two contractors the exclusive right to operate the

Mohawk, 451 F.3d at 50 n.5.
COHEN, supra note 9 § 12.08[4] (emphasis added).
36
Id. § 12.08[4].
37
Id.
38
Id. (citing United States ex rel. St. Regis Mohawk Tribe v. President R.C.-St. Regis
Mgmt. Co., 451 F.3d 44 (2d Cir. 2006)).
39
249 F. Supp. 2d 901, 907 (W.D. Mich. 2003) (hereinafter “Match”), vacated, 383
F.3d 512 (6th Cir. 2004).
40
Match, supra note 38, at 906.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id at 907.
34
35
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tribe’s first gaming facility as well as the exclusive right to enter into a
management contract with the tribe, “rendered the otherwise benign . . .
Settlement Agreement void as an unapproved collateral agreement providing for
the management of a gaming operation.”44
Conversely, several courts have found agreements between an Indian tribe
and contractors were not collateral to a management agreement, thus, did not
require NIGC approval. In Bounceback Technologies.com, Incorporated v.
Harrah’s Entertainment, Incorporated, a consulting agreement was not a
management contract nor collateral thereto, thus, it did not require NIGC
approval.45 This was, in part, because the only terms concerning the transfer of
management authority were included in a separate management agreement.
Thus, viewing the various agreements together, the collateral agreement in
question did not alter the allocation of management authority in the contract.46
Similarly, in United States of America ex rel. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v.
President R.C.-St. Regis Management Company, a construction contract did not
constitute a management contract or collateral to a management contract, thus, it
did not require NIGC approval.47 There were four primary reasons for the court’s
determination. First, the collateral agreement contained no terms relating to the
“operation of games, receipt of revenue, issuance of prizes, or payment of
expenses.”48 Second, the only relationship to gaming was the mention of a
“casino facility” in the contract, which was used to describe the building to be
constructed.49 Third, the contract was a standard-form contract used by the
contractor’s professional organization which dealt only with construction-related
requirements and included rights and obligations of a finite nature and definite
term.50 Finally, the payment was not based on a share of revenue.51
II. NIGC BULLETIN
Although the NIGC does not have authority to approve collateral
agreements, the NIGC still exercises authority to review collateral agreements to
determine if they are management contracts requiring approval:
In order to provide timely and uniform advice to tribes and
their contractors, the NIGC and the BIA have determined
that certain gaming-related agreements, such as consulting
Staudenmaier & Khalsa, Theseus, supra note 2 at 1146 (citing Jena Band of
Choctaw Indians v. Tri-Millennium Corp., Inc., 387 F. Supp. 2d 671, 680 (W.D. La.
2005)).
45
Id. at 1150 (citation omitted).
46
Id.
47
No. 7:02-CV-845, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12456, at *1, *10 (N.D.N.Y. June 13,
2005).
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id.
44

CRAIG COMMENT (DO NOT DELETE)

Spring 2018]

4/9/2018 10:22 PM

CONFUSION OVER COLLATERAL AGREEMENTS

191

agreements or leases or sales of gaming equipment, should
be submitted to the NIGC for review. In addition, if a tribe
or contractor is uncertain whether a gaming-related
agreement requires the approval of either the NIGC or the
BIA, they should submit those agreements to the
NIGC. The NIGC will review each such submission and
determine whether the agreement requires the approval of
the NIGC. If it does, the NIGC will notify the tribe to
formally submit the agreement. If the NIGC determines
that the agreement does not require the approval of the
NIGC, the submitter will be notified of that fact and the
NIGC will forward the agreement to the BIA for its
review.52
There are several policy justifications favoring the NIGC’s review of
collateral agreements, even those agreements that are ultimately determined to
not require NIGC approval. First, the NIGC must make its own determination as
to whether an agreement requires its approval.53 Second, it is necessary for the
NIGC to review collateral agreements as part of the review of management
contract in order to determine if any relationship between a tribe and contractor
exceeds IGRA’s compensation limits.54 Third, the review process serves as a
check to prevent contractors from taking advantage of the tribes.55
III. THE MACHAL V. JENA BAND OF CHOCTAW INDIANS56 RATIONALE
As stated in Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law § 12.08, Machal
provided a “better-reasoned approach” regarding the distinction between which
collateral agreements require NIGC approval.57 In Machal, the court explained,
“only those collateral agreements that should also be considered management
contracts because they provide for the management of a gaming operation are
void without NIGC approval.”58
The court further explained that if any contract that relates to the eventual
development of an anticipated gaming operation is construed as a management
contract — collateral or otherwise — it would be more difficult for tribes to
acquire the economic assistance often needed for procuring land and paying the
expenses necessary to the creation of a gaming operation and obtaining the
NAT’L INDIAN GAMING COMM’N, BULLETIN NO. 1993-3, SUBMISSION OF GAMINGRELATED CONTRACTS AND AGREEMENTS FOR REVIEW (July 1, 1993),
https://www.nigc.gov/compliance/detail/submission-of-gaming-related-contractsand-agreements-for-review.
53
See Washburn, Mechanics, supra note 27, at 345-46.
54
Id. at 345.
55
Id. at 333, 346.
56
387 F. Supp. 2d 659, 666 (W.D. La. 2005) [hereinafter “Machal”].
57
COHEN, supra note 9 at §12.08[4] n.28.
58
Id.
52
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requisite governmental approvals. Potential investors would be unable to
contract with tribes, and therefore, they would not be able to ensure that they
could recoup any of the money they invested in the tribe.
It is in the best interest of tribes that they be able to enter into enforceable
contracts that are precursors to the creation and licensing of a gaming operation.
Without such contracts, many tribes would not be able to procure the financial
backing that is often necessary for the creation of gaming operations. Such a state
of affairs would thwart the policies underlying the IGRA. By making it easier for
tribes to obtain financial backing, we make it easier for tribes to acquire the
economic development and self-sufficiency that accompanies the income from
tribal gaming operations.59
As discussed below, the Machal approach is consistent with the underlying
approach of the IGRA and should be adopted by the courts.
IV. EFFECTS OF THE CONFUSION OVER COLLATERAL AGREEMENTS
The purpose of IGRA is, in part: “to provide a statutory basis for the
operation of gaming by Indian tribes as a means of promoting tribal economic
development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments . . .”60 However,
tribes are disadvantaged by confusion over which collateral agreements require
NIGC approval, which, in turn, compromises the IGRA’s overarching goal. This
problem is magnified by two additional factors. First, there is clear disagreement
between the NIGC and the courts—as well as disagreement among the courts
themselves—over which agreements require NIGC approval. And second, the
NIGC has never been a party to a suit, thus, there is no judicial clarity.
As a result, even if a lawyer drafting a collateral agreement mimics the
agreement model from a case where the court determined an agreement was not
collateral to a management contract, “an agreement may be deemed
unenforceable for lack of NIGC approval on the basis of a single managementrelated term that transfers only a minor aspect of managerial responsibility.”61
Thus, lawyers, tribes, and contractors seeking to enter into agreements with a
tribe must walk a thin line of uncertainty to avoid entering into an unenforceable
agreement.
The first and most obvious way confusion over the approval of management
agreements disadvantages the tribes is that it effectively requires tribes to seek
approval of all collateral agreements which could plausibly qualify as
management agreements. This is because of the uncertainty surrounding which
agreements a court will find qualify as management contracts or agreements
collateral to management contracts. Further, the NIGC encourages the review of
agreements to determine whether they require approval. As a result, tribes are all

59
60
61

Id.
25 U.S.C. § 2702(1) (2012).
Staudenmaier & Khalsa, Theseus, supra note 2, at 1157 (citation omitted).
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but required to subject themselves to the long delays — sometimes exceeding 18
months — potentially to find out that a collateral agreement was not a
management contract or collateral thereto, thus, did not even require NIGC
approval.62 This is significant because, as in most industries, time is money, but
for casinos this could mean millions, if not billions.63 Further, the possibility
exists that, despite the NIGC’s determination a certain contract is a collateral
agreement that does not require official approval, a court will still find that the
contract did require NIGC approval.
In addition to the losses discussed above, there are two additional ways that
a tribe seeking to enter into a collateral agreement are affected by this delay.
First, in the short-term, the tribes miss out economically: every day that
development is delayed is one less day customers can be gambling in the tribe’s
casino. Second, when casino construction and development is delayed by NIGC
approval of collateral agreements, tribes lose bargaining power to engage
contractors and subcontractors in favorable deals. This could affect which
contractors and developers are willing to enter agreements, and may compromise
the tribe’s bargaining power with those contractors that are willing to enter into
agreement. Thus, this delay — despite its intent to protect the tribes —
contradicts IGRA’s underlying goal of tribal self-sufficiency through economic
development by depriving the tribes of potential revenue and savings.
Because of the potential issues caused by NIGC review, tribes are
incentivized to attempt to sidestep the delay by either attempting to hide
management contract provisions in collateral agreements or to “gamble” on
whether a court will declare a given contract void. If a tribe attempts to hide
management contract provisions in a collateral agreement, it is possible that a
court, after reviewing the agreement, may retroactively void the contract based
on a determination that the agreement is a management contract or collateral to
a management contract. Similarly, a tribe that decides to enter into a contract, in
the hope the contract will later be found enforceable, may expose itself to the
potential financial losses associated with an unenforceable agreement.
This risk, however, poses yet two more problems for the tribes seeking to
engage legal representation for drafting collateral agreements. First, a firm
familiar with the prolonged litigation in SRC Holding Corporation, discussed
above, may be less willing to assist a tribe in any matters concerning gaming.
Even those firms that are willing may be far more likely to recommend NIGC
approval of almost any agreement, given the high degree of uncertainty and
subsequent risk of malpractice. Second, to compensate for the potential risk of
malpractice, yet again, tribes may be at a bargaining disadvantage and have to
pay law firms higher compensation in exchange for the risk the firm will take on

Washburn, Mechanics, supra note 27, at 334.
2016 INDIAN GAMING REVENUES INCREASED 4.4% (July 12, 2017),
https://www.nigc.gov/news/detail/2016-indian-gaming-revenues-increased-4.4. See
also Staudenmaier & Khalsa, Theseus, supra note 2, at 1123.
62
63

CRAIG COMMENT (DO NOT DELETE)

194

4/9/2018 10:22 PM

UNLV GAMING LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 8:185

for a potential malpractice suit if a given contract is later declared void.
Another issue, as discussed above in Machal, is that investors may be weary
to invest in tribal gaming for a variety of reasons. Among these reasons is the
uncertainty of the enforcement of contracts. Unlike a typical business-investment
transaction where the parties to a contract need only worry about contract law
principles and pitfalls, potential tribal gaming investors must be cognizant of the
possible adverse financial effects of a contract that is determined void for lack of
NIGC approval. Again, given the uncertainty, investors may require higher
compensation to make up for the inherent risks of their investment.
These problems are exacerbated by the fact the parties on either side of the
contract may later use lack of NIGC approval as either a sword or a shield. For
example, a tribe that entered into a contract for development may seek to avoid
their obligations under the contract by asserting that the contract is void for want
of NIGC approval. This may be advantageous to a tribe under circumstances
where economic development is slower than anticipated. Conversely, a company
seeking to avoid its obligations may, after entering into the contract, similarly
assert lack of NIGC review of a contract as an affirmative defense to its failure
to meet its obligations.
Considering the policy rationale in Machal and IGRA’s underlying goal of
promoting tribal self-sufficiency and economic development, it would be
beneficial to develop a bright-line rule for determining which agreements require
NIGC approval. The risk of a void contract that leaves one party to bear the risk
would be minimized if the courts agreed to establish a presumption for the
enforceability of contracts based on written assertion that the contracts are not
“management contracts.” This would give the tribes more bargaining power, thus
allowing them to benefit under traditional free-market principles.
Alternatively, courts should allow for severability of contracts that are
determined to be collateral to management contracts. Contracts should not be
declared void merely because they contain terms that render the contract
unenforceable absent NIGC approval. Instead, those collateral agreement terms
should be severed. Allowing for the severability of those contracts collateral to
management contracts would prevent the tribe or a management company from
taking advantage of each other. This would, in turn, reduce the risk of entering
into such contracts with tribes interested in gaming and the risk of malpractice,
thus, furthering the goals of promoting tribal self-sufficiency and economic
development.
CONCLUSION
Given the disagreement between the federal courts and the NIGC as to which
agreements require NIGC review, there is a great deal of uncertainty. In an
attempt to provide clarity, the NIGC will provide determinations into whether a
certain agreement is a management contract or collateral to a management
contract such that it requires NIGC approval or, alternatively, whether an
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agreement is collateral and enforceable as a contract without approval. However,
this determination process adds considerable time and expense, thus burdening
tribes.
A tribe seeking to avoid the long review process could retain legal counsel
to write an agreement avoiding the pitfalls of those agreements determined to be
management contracts or collateral thereto by referencing cases where courts
have determined agreements did not require such approval. But, this approach is
risky given the uncertainty and confusion within the courts and the disagreement
between some courts and the NIGC. Thus, the confusion over which agreements
require NIGC approval continues to put the tribes at a disadvantage,
subsequently interfering with the underlying goal of allowing the tribes to
achieve economic self-sufficiency through gaming.

